ONE AMONG EQUALS?

 

44. ONE AMONG EQUALS?

Jawaharlal Nehru’s cabinet was in session. The topic taken up for discussion was the Nehru-Liaquat Ali Pact under which refugees were permitted to return unhindered for the disposal of their properties. The discussion was heated, especially because there was no convergence of views between Nehru and Shyamaprasad Mukherjee. When the debate turned loudly argumentative, Sardar Vallabhai Patel quietly left the room. Nehru and Mukherjee continued their impassioned arguments. Fearing that something untoward might happen, their colleagues managed to persuade the two belligerents to postpone the discussion for another day.

This was described by N V Gadgil, a minister in the Nehru cabinet, in his book Government from Inside.

Syamaprasad Mukherjee subsequently resigned from the Nehru cabinet.

In a democracy difference of opinion between the Prime Minister and his ministerial colleagues is not something new. Our parliamentary democratic system is modelled after Britain. Instances are many in that country of undermining the basic democratic concept of collective responsibility of the cabinet. It was not uncommon to see a quirky style of parliamentary democracy with ministers wholeheartedly ratifying government decisions in the cabinet and then going out to vehemently criticise them in public.

When the question of Britain’s membership in the European Community came up Englishmen were in two camps. The discord was so severe that it shook the very foundation of the then cabinet. A consensus on the issue could not be reached and the cabinet meeting finally ended after the ministers agreed to disagree. The ministers were then given the freedom to vote according to their conscience in an opinion poll on the matter. This freedom was also given to openly participate in the camapign preceding the poll. The only stipulation was that the ministers siould not oppose in parliament the government stand on the issue.

In India even a Prime Minister with charismatic personality like Nehru could not control the cabinet in keepng with his views. Ministers were also not rare who accused the Prime Minister of being dictatorial. In 1948 Sardar Patel resorted to Police action in Hyderabad ignoring Nehru’s objections. Rafi Ahmed Kidwai’s action in giving refuge in India for Nepal’s King Tribhuvan also went against the wishes of Nehru. The arrest of Kashmir Premier Sheik Abdulla was also shown by historical records as Kidwai’s decision behind Nehru’s back. The powerful Prime Minister could only silently put up with such actions by his colleagues.

This did not mean Nehru was just one among equals in his cabinet. Often he had been described as a banyan tree. But Nehru’s style of doing things as he pleased had come in for covert and overt criticism from colleagues. Nehru never considered it necessary to discuss with his ministerial colleagues on any matter relating to foreign affairs, his most favourite subject. Initially the cabinet was informed of the appointments of Ambassadors but its ratification was not sought. On one occasion a meeting of the cabinet was at its fag end when he informed it of the appointment of Sir Mirza Muhammed Ismail, a former Dewan, as an Ambassador. When N V Gadgil asked him if he was merely informing the cabinet or placing it before it for discussion, Nehru was obviously annoyed. After the cabinet he mentioned this to Patel, but the latter did not mince words when expressing his strong reservation against the appointment. Though Nehru rescinded the appointment, he stopped the practice, altogether, of informing the cabinet of such decisions.

Till Patel’s death, Nehru used to seek his opinion on most matters. Patel was usually silent in the cabinet meetings. His style was to privately talk to the Prime Minister before and after the cabinet meetings. Those privy to inside goings on had said that after Patel’s death cabinet meetings more or less had become Nehru Durbars.

It is for the Prime Minister to decide who all should be in his cabinet. But how free the Prime Minister is in the exercise of this power depends on two factors. One is the position of the Prime Minister in the party. The second is the position of the party in parliament. Was any Prime Minister ever able to pick and choose his ministers as he deemed fit? The answer is no when we look at the functioning of the parliamentary system in various countries,inclduing India and Britain. Even Nehru did not have the complete power to choose his ministers. The influence of Patel in government formation was clearly evident. K M Munishi, R R Diwakar, Shanmugham Chetty,C D Deshmukh, N V Gadgil and C H Bawa were considered to be Patel’s nominees in the cabinet. Moreover, Vijayalakshmi Pandit and T T Krishnamachari were kept out of the cabinet in view of objections by Patel.

A similar situation cropped up between 1964 and 1967. Morarji Desai had become a force to reckon with in Indian politics. Lal Bahadur Shastri, who became Prime Minister after Nehru’s death, had to accommodate in his ministry 13 senior ministers and 15 ministers of state from the previous dispensation. Though it was after ignoring Morarji Desai’s claims that Lal Bahadaur Shastri was made the Prime Minister, Morarji himself had to be selected to the cabinet. On his own, Shastri selected only three persons for his cabinet, newcomers S K Patil, Sanjeeva Reddy and Indira Gandhi.

However, Shastri ensured that allocation of portfolios was fully his prerogative. It was Shastri’s personal decision that saw Sardar Swaran Singh as Foreign Minister. When a colleague chose to question this, Shastri categorically told him it was his prerogative.

Indira Gandhi who succeeded Shastri was a powerful Prime Minister but even she did not have the absolute power to pick and choose her ministers. She was forced to induct Sachindra Chaudhury and Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed into the cabinet in place of her choices Ashok Sen and Humayun Kabir. This was prsumed to be under pressure from Atulya Ghosh, Gulzarilal Nanda and Jagjivan Ram.

When Morarji Desai of the Janata Party became Prime Minister, he was in fact heading a coalition government. Here again the Prime Minister did not enjoy the privilege or prerogative of choosing his ministers. It was for the parties in the coalition to decide who should represent them in the ministry. Desai was willing to accept Jagjivan Ram and Charan Singh as Deputy Prime Ministers, but the two senior leaders insisted on only one post of Deputy Prime Minister.

The situation was no different when Charan Singh became Prime Minister. Y B Chavan, Congress nominee, was Deputy Prime Minister. The Congress further decided its other representatives in the cabinet. Similarly All India Anna DMK chose its nominees in the cabinet. In all such instances even the concept of the Prime Minister as the first among equals received a beating.

In coalitions the position of the Prime Minister was lowered to one among equals. This is not a phenomenon confined to India.

In the 1977 ministry,Charan Singh insisted on getting the Home portfolio and the Prime Minister had to succumb to the demand. In the following year when Charan Singh returned to become Deputy Prime Minister he was given the freedom to choose any portfolio other than Home.

At the practical level, it is not possible for the Prime Minister to fully utilise his powers for the re-allocation of portfolios. In 1962 Nehru was personally inclined to allot the Finance portfolio to T T Krishnamachari. But he had to yield to pressure from Morarji Desai. In 1963 S K Patil successfully thwarted a move by the Prime Minister for a change of his portfolio. In 1966 Indira Gandhi was interested in changing the portfolios of Gulzarilal Nanda and Sachindra Chaudhury, but withdrew from the move because of pressure from Kamaraj,Atulya Ghosh and Hitendra Desai.

Later, Indira Gandhi succeeded in establishing her unchallenged supremacy in the party and in giving a practical shape to her leadership image both in the party and the government. She could fully implement her decision to change the portfolios of Y B Chavan, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed and Dinesh Singh. When the powerful Chavan expressed his reservation against the change, he was bluntly told to keep out of the cabinet if had any reservations.

Prime Ministers also have the power, in concept, to remove any minister at any time. According to Article 74(2) of the Constitution, Ministers conitinue in their position subject to the ‘pleasure’ of the President of India. The pleasure of the President is in fact the decision of the Prime Minister conveyed to him. Ministers sometimes get into difficulties when this concept coalesces with the concept of collective responsibility. It is possible that the cabinet takes a decision that a minister may not personally approve of. Even if it is against his conscience, he had to go according to the decision or resign from the cabinet.

Intances are not rare of ministers quitting cabinet on policy differences. In 1949 Dr John Mathai resigned in protest against the composition of the Planning Commission. It was already pointed out that Shyamaprasad Mukherjee had resigned from the Nehru cabinet in view of differences over the Nehru-Liaquat Ali Pact of 1950. In 1951 B R Ambedkar resigned, saying he was being kept out of policy formulation forums. V V Giri resigned in 1984 protesting against the Bank Award which according to him went against the interests of the employees. If C D Deshmukh put in his papers protesting against the reorganisation of Bombay state, C Subramaniam and O V Azhakesan resigned in protest against the offical language policy. It is a different matter they withdrew their resignations in view of the persuasive pressure from Lal Bahadur Shastri. If Mahavir Thyagi opted out of the cabinet in 1966 pointing out differences over the Tashkent Accord with Pakistan, it was the same issue that prompted M C Chagla to resign the following year. Mohan Dharia quit to register protest against the government’s approach towards the ‘total revolution’ spearheaded by Jayaprakash Narayan.

A Prime Minister has two options if he feels that a minister should be dropped from his council. He can either demand his resignation or dismiss him. In 1963 Nehru resorted to a novel method to see that some inconvenient ministers were dropped. Through the good office of the party chief K Kamaraj, a plan, named Kamaraj Plan, was put forward to get senior ministers in the government to build up the party. Taking recourse to this clever plan, Nehru managed to get rid of senior ministers Morarji Desai, Jagajivan Ram,S K Patil, Lal Bahadur Shastri, A Gopala Reddy and K N Srimali and some Congress Chief Ministers.

His daughter Indira Gandhi was slightly different in her approach. While she asked Swaran Singh, Umashankar Dikshit and Sher Singh to submit their resignations, she recommended to the President dismissal of Mohan Dharia.

Morarji Desai had sought the ratification of the cabinet for the removal of Charan Singh and Raj Narayan.

Winston Churchil had said that if a Prime Minister had to succeed he should not hesitate to become a butcher. As and when required, he should be prepared to throw out ministers.

But nothing is impossible in politics. There may be occasions of a minister refusing to resign when asked by the Prime Minister to do so. In such a situation what is the course open to him? Though not many instances are there at the centre, there are several such in the states. Rao Birendra Singh in Haryana (1961), Congress Ministers in U P (1970), Daorathram Sangyan in Himachal Pradesh (1972), Mrs Chandramathi in Haryana(1972) and Satyavani Muthu in Tamil Nadu (1974) are ministers who refused to quit when called upon to do so. In such situations a Chief Ministers had two options before him. Submit his own resignation and then reconstitute the ministry or recommend to the governor to dismiss the ministers refusing to quit. Both these options had been utilised in different times in different states. The Prime Minister also could make use of these two options. The President is bound to accept the Prme Minister’s recommendation for the dismisssal of a minister. But there are exceptions. According to constitutional experts, if the Prime Minister’s party is a minority in the ruling coalition, the President is not bound to act on such recommendation.

If a powerful leader of a powerful party becomes Prime Minister, the Prime Minister’s voice will become the voice of the cabinet. And his decisions would become cabinet decisions also. In the Indira Gandhi government, initially there were open discussions in the cabinet but in due course it was said that the cabinet took decisions as per her whims and fancies. In the case of the Emergency, the cabinet came to know of it after the declaration was made. There is neither law or precedent to assess rights and wrongs of such matters. It depends on how one views the impugned action in retrospect. If it is seen as reasonable it is right and if it is not justified it may be construed as the Prime Minister acting on his or her whims.

The minister who presides over the cabinet in the absence of the Prime Minister is generally considered as the number two in the cabinet. However, there had been concerted moves by the Prime Ministers to see that all ministers were treated equally and that no one gained an upper hand. During Indira Gandhi’s foreign tours, ministers presided over cabinet meetings in rotation, in alphebetical order. In this way Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed presided over a cabinet meeting. Y.B. Chavan and Jagjivan Ram could not get that opportunity. There was once a remark by a wag that Indira Gandhi even thought of inducting some junior ministers whose names began with the letters A or B, just to avoid some others from chairing the cabinet.

In Britain the person considered as a model Prime Minister was Sir Robert Peel. The strongest Prime Minister was undoubtedly Winston Churchill. The war time cabinet was only a shadow of Churchill. Many of the important communications from Churchill to U S President Roosevelt were brought before the cabinet after they were sent. Perhaps no other Prime Minister would have received the kind of cooperation and support he had received from ministers belonging to different parties, Chrchill had once said.

The great constitutional expert Ivor Jennings had said that with strong support from the party and full confience of the leaders, a Prime Minister could wield even more powers than the Roman emperors.